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Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Budget Committee, I am honored to appear before you 
today. My remarks are about the spectrum auctions in the United States. I will discuss spectrum auction 
successes, failures, and what I think are key issues in upcoming spectrum auctions. Although I have 
advised many governments and private parties on spectrum auctions, these remarks are my own views. 
Since December 1993, I have been involved extensively in spectrum auctions around the world. I 
have advised the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the design and conduct of spectrum 
auctions. I have advised several other governments on spectrum auctions, including Mexico, Australia, 
Canada, and Austria. I have also advised the U.S. Department of Justice on collusion issues related to the 
FCC spectrum auctions. Additionally, I have served as the auction expert for numerous bidders in 
spectrum auctions around the world. My research on spectrum auctions is available from my web site 
www.cramton.umd.edu. The research appears in about a dozen articles published in academic journals. 
The FCC auctions have shown that using an auction to allocate scarce resources is far superior to the 
prior methods: comparative hearings and lotteries. With a well-designed auction, resources are allocated 
efficiently to the parties that value them the most, and the Treasury obtains much-needed revenues in the 
process. 
Since July 1994, the FCC has conducted two-dozen spectrum auctions, raising over $20 billion for 
the U.S. Treasury (not all of which has been collected). The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to 
hundreds of companies. Overall, the auctions have been a tremendous success, putting essential spectrum 
in the hands of those best able to use it. The auctions have fostered innovation and competition in wireless 
communication services. Taxpayers, companies, and especially consumers have benefited from the 
auctions. In comparison with other countries, the FCC auctions represent the state-of-the-art in spectrum 
auction design and implementation. The FCC began its auctions with an innovative design, and has 
continued to improve the auctions since then. The FCC’s leadership in spectrum auctions has had positive 
consequences worldwide. Many countries wisely have imitated the FCC auctions; those that have not 
have suffered from inefficient license assignments and other flaws. 
All but two of the FCC auctions have used a simultaneous ascending design in which groups of 
related licenses are auctioned simultaneously over many rounds of bidding. In each round, bidders submit 
new higher bids on any of the licenses they desire, bumping the standing high bidder. The auction ends 
when a round passes without any bidding; that is, no bidder is willing to raise the price on any license. 
This design is a natural extension of the English auction to multiple related goods. Its advantage over a 
sequence of English auctions is that it gives the bidders more flexibility in moving among licenses as 
prices change. As one license gets bid up, a bidder can shift to an alternative that represents a better value. 
In this way, bidders are able to arbitrage across substitutable licenses. Moreover, they can build packages 
of complementary licenses using the information revealed in the process of bidding. 
There is now substantial evidence that this auction design has been successful. Revenues often have 
exceeded industry and government estimates. The simultaneous ascending auction may be partially 
responsible for the large revenues. By revealing information in the auction process, bidder uncertainty is   2 
reduced, and the bidders safely can bid more aggressively. Also, revenues may increase to the extent the 
design enables bidders to piece together more efficient packages of licenses. 
Despite the general success, the FCC auctions have experienced a few problems from which one can 
draw important lessons. These problems and the challenges of upcoming auctions will be the focus of my 
remarks. Although I am focusing on past problems, I must reiterate that the auctions have been a 
remarkable success. The fact that there have been some bumps along the road is not an indication of any 
failure by the FCC, but rather an inevitable consequence of an ambitious program in a setting of great 
uncertainty and technological change. Even the best quarterback throws an occasional interception, and 
even the best quarterback can improve by watching the films. 
Reduce the effectiveness of bidders’ revenue-reducing strategies 
The information and flexibility available to the bidders in a simultaneous ascending auction is a two-
edged sword. Although desirable in reducing bidder uncertainty and promoting efficient license 
aggregations, the information and flexibility—in certain circumstances—can be used to reduce auction 
prices. In particular, revenue-reducing strategies may be effective when bidder competition is weak and 
when bidders already have a sense of who should win what. In this case, the auction is best thought of as 
a negotiation among the bidders, in which bidders are only able to communicate through their bids. The 
auction ends when there are no disagreements about who should win what.  
Revenue-reducing strategies take several forms, but two are most important. The first is demand 
reduction. This is the tendency for a bidder to reduce its spectrum demands, knowing that demanding less 
will tend to reduce spectrum prices. This is a unilateral strategy that is best addressed in the choice of the 
band plan and geographic scope of the licenses. License structures that make it more difficult for the 
bidders to split up the spectrum are less vulnerable to demand reduction. For example, offering large 
nationwide licenses, in which no bidder can win more than one, prevents the bidders from splitting up the 
spectrum at auction. 
The second revenue-reducing strategy is retaliatory bidding. This can be thought of as coordinated 
demand reduction. It is sending another bidder the message that they should stay off your licenses, if they 
want you to stay off their licenses. Retaliatory bids were especially clear in early auctions when it was 
possible to use the trailing digits of bids to identify relevant markets. The bidders were effectively able to 
say things like, “I’ll stay out of New York, if you stay out of Los Angeles.” This tactic was eliminated by 
the FCC by requiring bids to be stated in an integer number of bid increments above the standing high 
bid. However, it is still possible for bidders in certain circumstances to use retaliatory bidding to keep 
prices low. Retaliatory bidding is best minimized through careful choice of activity rules, reserve prices, 
and bid increments.  
Spectrum caps effectively limit anticompetitive concentration 
A spectrum cap is a direct method of limiting the concentration of spectrum for a particular type of 
service in a particular area. Its advantage is that it is a bright-line test that is easy to enforce, both before 
and after the auction. It has played a critical role in ensuring that there are many competitors for mobile 
wireless services in each market. This competition has led to clear gains for consumers. Its disadvantage 
is that it is overly simplistic. Spectrum caps cannot take into account the specifics of each situation, and 
determine whether consumers would be made better or worse off with greater concentration of ownership. 
The best policy on spectrum caps is a middle ground, where binding caps are imposed in initial 
auctions, but then these caps give way once it is believed that vigorous competition has been established. 
Then individual mergers can be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.    3 
In setting and revising spectrum caps, the FCC should err on the side of too stringent a cap, since it is 
much harder to breakup a firm than to allow a merger. If concentration is viewed as a potential problem 
going into an auction, then spectrum caps, rather than case-by-case review, must be used, since only caps 
can provide an instantaneous determination of what is allowed and what is not. Such a rapid response is 
essential in a simultaneous ascending auction. Bids must be binding commitments until they are topped. 
Hence, at every point in the auction, the bidders must know what is allowed and what is not. 
Typically, spectrum caps lower auction revenues, but there is one important exception. In situations 
where incumbent bidders have an advantage, a spectrum cap may actually increase revenues and promote 
efficiency. In such a situation without a spectrum cap, non-incumbents may be unwilling to participate in 
the auction, knowing that the incumbents will ultimately win. As a result, in the auction without the cap 
only the incumbents show up, there is a lack of competition, and the incumbents split the licenses up 
among themselves at low prices. With the cap, the non-incumbents know that non-incumbents will win 
licenses, giving them the incentive and ability to secure the needed financing from capital markets. A 
competitive auction with market prices results. Although this situation may seem special, I believe it is a 
realistic case. This phenomenon of  incumbent bidders getting good deals, because of a lack of non-
incumbent competition, appears to have occurred in some prior auctions. 
Special treatment for designated entities should be implemented carefully 
One of the auction objectives that Congress gave the FCC is to have a diversity of auction winners. 
While small and diverse owners may well be a desirable goal for broadcast media with editorial content, 
the same arguments likely do not apply to basic communications like PCS. 
Special treatment to designated entities is to some extent premised on the idea that small is beautiful. 
But what we have learned in the last several years is that there are significant scale economies in wireless 
communications. Part of the scale economy is the bargaining advantage it creates with equipment 
suppliers. Another part is scale economies in marketing. But perhaps the largest is the value that 
consumers place on seamless nationwide roaming. As a result, the marketplace has shifted toward 
nationwide services in most wireless categories. These nationwide services are necessarily billion dollar 
deals, or tens-of-billions in the case of  broadband mobile services. What consumers need is a variety of 
strong national competitors. In many cases, the small regional players cannot compete. The designated 
entity rules may simply be setting up the small businesses for failure. This is not desirable, especially 
given that the unjust enrichment rules, discussed below, effectively prevent resale to the higher-valued 
use should failure occur. 
On balance, the best policy may be to discontinue favors to designated entities, and to use spectrum 
caps to guarantee new entry where desirable and to prevent over-consolidation of spectrum. An 
alternative is to offer non-incumbents bidding credits to encourage new entry. My reason for this 
conclusion has to do with the practical difficulties of effectively implementing favors for designated 
entities, which I discuss below. 
The FCC has used bidding credits, set-asides, and installment payments to encourage the 
participation and success of designated entities. The idea is that without special treatment, these small 
businesses would find it difficult to compete with the large incumbents. The favored treatment can serve 
to “level the playing field,” and thereby foster innovation and intensify competition. 
Although this is a valid point in theory, and even has some empirical support, the FCC must be 
cautious when using favors for designated entities. A vivid example is the FCC’s only major setback, the 
C-block broadband PCS auction. (Other disappointing auctions were IVDS and WCS, but none have 
involved the economic loss seen in the C-block.) The auction failed largely because of overly attractive 
installment payments (10% down and 6-year interest-only at the risk-free 10-year Treasury rate). This   4 
encouraged speculative bidding, which led to all the major bidders defaulting and declaring bankruptcy. 
Even now, years after the auction, much of this C-block spectrum lies unused, tied up in bankruptcy 
litigation. Installment payments were a bad idea, because they advantaged the bidders with the most 
speculative business plans. In addition, installment payments put the FCC in the role of banker, an 
activity in which the FCC has no advantage. Since the C-block experience, the FCC no longer offers 
installment payments, a decision I fully support. 
To preserve the integrity of the auctions, Congress should make clear that bidders cannot tie up 
licenses in bankruptcy proceedings. The end of the auction must be the final determination of terms, not 
the beginning of negotiations with the FCC under the threat of bankruptcy. My understanding is that this 
clarification is needed even in auctions without installment payments. 
The two other instruments to favor designated entities—set-asides and bidding credits—may be 
desirable in special situations. The typical situation is one where the FCC is attempting to encourage 
competition in the auction and the post-auction market for wireless services. By leveling the playing field 
between incumbents and new entrants, competition may be enhanced. 
Still, set-asides and bidding credits have serious potential problems. Gauging the right level of set-
asides or bidding credits is extremely difficult. Also, it is nearly impossible to target the favor to the 
desired group. The creation of fronts, carefully constructed to satisfy the rules but circumvent their intent, 
has been a constant problem. 
One general rule, whether using set-asides or bidding credits, is that it is best for incumbents and 
non-incumbents to compete in the same auction. Then if competition among non-incumbents is 
sufficiently robust, the non-incumbents will be able to spill over to the licenses that incumbent bidders 
can bid on. This spillover increases competition, and hence revenues in the auction. 
Another problem with favors for designated entities is their impact on the resale of spectrum. The 
auction rules prohibit resale to a non-designated entity for a period of time, and include an “unjust 
enrichment” provision that requires that the FCC be paid back the bidding credit plus interest. The reality 
has been that the bidding credits are often bid away by competition among designated entities. Indeed, 
even after accounting for the value of the installment payments and the bidding credits, the C-block 
auction resulted in prices that were well above what the large firms paid in the AB-block auction. Given 
these facts, it is difficult to understand why the small firms are required to pay a huge “unjust enrichment” 
penalty, when there is no unjust enrichment. As it stands, the penalty is so large that it is often an 
insurmountable barrier to trade. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with favors to designated entities is that they greatly complicate 
the auction process. Too often the rules for designated entities become a central issue in establishing the 
auction procedures. These rules are complex. They are difficult to write, difficult to enforce, and difficult 
to defend. The absolute worst outcome in a spectrum auction is having the licenses tied up in litigation. 
Until the litigation is resolved the building of communication services cannot begin. Even the risk of 
litigation can have a disastrous effect on auction participation, and hence revenues. Both the Congress and 
the FCC should do what they can to make sure that spectrum resources are not destroyed by litigation. 
In the upcoming reauction of C-block licenses, I recommend eliminating the set-aside for small-
businesses. Rather I would use a spectrum cap, or possibly bidding credits, to encourage new entry. 
Consumer interests are best served by the entry of strong competitors. Given the significant scale 
economies, it is unlikely that true small businesses can provide this competition.   5 
Implementing an effective auction takes time and involves difficult tradeoffs  
A second auction disappointment was the Wireless Communication Services (WCS) auction, held in 
April 1997. Revenues in this auction were a tiny fraction of what they might have been. The main 
problem was the stringent out-of-band emission limit. Equipment manufacturers warned that this would 
threaten the commercial viability of this spectrum. The low prices at auction and the absence today of 
activity in this band appears to confirm that the equipment manufacturers were right. At the time of the 
decision, the FCC was facing a difficult tradeoff between the rights of prior winners of neighboring 
licenses and the WCS use. Such decisions are always difficult, but the FCC was under intense time 
pressure to meet the timetable that Congress set for the auction. This aggressive timetable may well have 
led the FCC to make a too-hasty decision on interference rules, which damaged the value of this 
spectrum. Congress’s desire for receiving revenues according to its fiscal calendar may have resulted in 
substantially reduced auction revenues. 
The FCC has been put in a similar position in the upcoming 700 MHz auction of UHF channels 60-
69. My hope is that the FCC is better equipped to handle this challenge; my fear is that critical aspects of 
the auction may be rushed. 
Facilitate efficient clearing when auctioning encumbered spectrum 
An issue of increasing importance is the auctioning of encumbered spectrum. Most of the current and 
future spectrum auctions have incumbents. These incumbents must either be cleared or worked-around in 
order for the new entrant to provide a service. Negotiations between the new entrant and the incumbent 
are often difficult due to holdout by the incumbent. A second problem occurs when multiple new entrants 
benefit from the clearing of a single incumbent; then each new entrant can hope to free-ride on the 
clearing done by others. These problems often prevent or delay the efficient clearing of the spectrum. The 
FCC can play an important role in adopting rules that promote the efficient clearing of the spectrum by 
structuring the rules of negotiation appropriately. The broadband PCS rule-making is a good example. 
The FCC adopted rules that went a long way in minimizing the holdout and free-rider problems that 
undermine efficient clearing. 
The upcoming 700 MHz auction is a more difficult case. This spectrum currently is used for analog 
television channels 60-69. The spectrum cannot be used for new services until the analog broadcasters 
terminate over-the-air broadcasting on these channels. Since the FCC appears not to have the authority to 
adopt PCS-type rules that promote efficient clearing, the best that the FCC can do is to not create barriers 
to efficient clearing. In particular, it is important that incumbent broadcasters retain their must-carry status 
and DTV allotment, even after their analog UHF broadcast is terminated. Otherwise, a broadcaster will 
have an artificial incentive to stay, blocking the new communication service. 
Continue to innovate in auction design 
In the long-term, the FCC will want to expand its auction capabilities to allow for two-sided 
auctions. For example, in an auction of encumbered spectrum, the FCC can allow holders of existing 
licenses to bring their licenses to the table. In this way, bidders can purchase in one auction the 
complementary assets (the old and the new license). 
A second area of innovation is the development of practical methods for combinatorial auctions, 
which allow bidders to bid on packages of complementary licenses. Combinatorial auctions have been an 
active area of study by the FCC and other researchers. These new auction forms promise further 
improvements in an already successful auction program.   6 
Promote market-based tests in spectrum management 
The FCC auctions are a critical step in the march toward market-based spectrum management. The 
FCC and Congress should continue on this path. Flexibility should be the norm, not constraints. 
Constraints should appear only when those constraints help foster a more competitive environment by 
adding essential structure. My specific recommendations are: 
•  Allow service flexibility 
•  Allow technical flexibility 
•  Set initial interference rules, but allow trading 
•  Set initial geographic and bandwidth scope to an ex ante view of how spectrum will be used, but 
allow spectrum partitioning and geographic disaggregation 
•  Eliminate buildout requirements 
•  Allow transfers of licenses 
Many of the current restrictions are holdovers from the days of comparative hearings. These needless 
regulations should be eliminated. The rate of technological change is now so great that attempting to craft 
specific regulations as was done in the past is hopeless and destructive. Rather, the FCC and Congress 
should focus on broad principles that encourage competition. Congress especially should refrain from the 
micro-management of spectrum policy. The complex economic and engineering tradeoffs are much better 
left to a specialized agency. 
Make markets work better 
Communications policy today is not about regulating a monopolist; it is about making markets work 
better. To satisfy this new mission, the FCC must transform itself in the new millennium. The FCC’s 
auction program is a major step, and a vivid illustration, of where it should be headed. 
I have pointed out a few bumps in an otherwise remarkable auction program. Most of these bumps 
are where good intentions got in the way of sound economics. In the new world of auctions and 
competition, the economics cannot be ignored. Good policy must respect the economic forces of markets. 
Indeed, policy decisions should follow from the simple question: “Does this policy promote competition 
in communication services?” If the answer is yes, I am all for it. 